INTRODUCTION
This is the first in a series of articles dealing with the impact of managed care on the practice of neonatology. This article will offer some information relevant to the threshold question of whether managed care is likely to continue making inroads in neonatology. It also will provide suggestions on how to evaluate managed care organizations (''MCOs'') and it will provide some general thoughts on potential physician liability associated with participation in managed care. The second article will discuss specific theories of liability affecting physicians under managed care and will provide suggestions on how to reduce that potential liability. The final article in this series will discuss a number of contract provisions typically found in managed care agreements and the legal implications of those provisions.
WILL MANAGED CARE COME TO NEONATOLOGY? Is There a Supply:Demand Imbalance? Historically, managed care companies have done well financially in areas where there is a supply:demand imbalance. Regarding the supply of neonatal services, studies indicate that there are approximately 3200 board-certified neonatologists in the United States, practicing in 830 NICUs with 19,000 beds. On the demand side, of approximately 4,000,000 births in the United States in 1994, various studies reflect a 7% incidence of NICU admissions, an 11% incidence of prematurity, a 70% incidence of infant death associated with preterm birth, a 7% incidence of low birth weight, a 1% incidence of very low birth rate, a 4% to 6% incidence of respiratory distress syndrome and a 2% incidence of multiple gestation.
One study analyzing the supply:demand ratio concluded that there was an excess of 300,000 special care bed days in 1991 [Schwartz RM. Supply and demand for neonatal intensive care: trends and implications. J Perinatol 1996 Nov-Dec;16(6): 483-9.] Anecdotally, a representative of a physician practice management company estimated that by applying managed care principles to neonatology, the number of neonatologists necessary to serve the needs of the current population could be reduced to 1200.
The Cost of Neonatal Services
Another factor that attracts managed care to a particular specialty is the presence of a significant number of ''high dollar'' cases. Neonatology qualifies on that score. Recent studies estimate the cost of ''poor birth outcomes'' at US$5.6 billion per year, with an average mother-infant charge of US$90,000 for very-low-birth-weight infants and US$39,000 for infants with other preterm problems. Even an ''uncomplicated'' preterm birth can generate mother-infant charges averaging as high as US$35,000, compared to an average of US$10,500 for normal full-term births.
An insurance industry review of health care claims exceeding US$25,000 showed that 68% of those claims involved preterm births or congenital anomalies. The fact that a significant percentage of neonatology charges are paid by private health insurance (as high as 70% in one study) also makes neonatology an attractive market for MCOs.
Managed Care Will Come to Neonatology Because ''That's Where the Money Is'' Some commentators believe that managed care will not make significant inroads in neonatology because neonatologists deal with fragile patients whose cases are highly technical and complex, which tends to reduce the utility of treatment protocols, case management and utilization management. Also, MCOs may be reluctant to ''micromanage'' neonatal cases because they fear the potential medical malpractice liability associated with care decisions prompted by utilization management concerns.
Another school of thought suggests that managed care will increase its penetration in neonatology because neonatology represents such a significant number of high dollar claims, and because managed care experience in California and other areas has shown some success in decreasing length of stay and associated expenses. These commentators also point to the fact that in the
absence of case management, reimbursement incentives and utilization management incentives are at odds; since there has been relatively little managed care involvement in neonatology to date, neonatology reimbursement is viewed as high, compared to reimbursement in specialties with a history of managed care. Finally, neonatology is viewed as a specialty in which there is a significant amount of variability in treatment, and managed care theory holds that reducing variability improves care while decreasing costs. The author's unsolicited opinion is that managed care will increase its focus on neonatology because, in the words of Willie Sutton, ''that's where the money is.'' Since neonatology cases reflect a high percentage of health care expenditures, and since managed care companies have squeezed reimbursement to a minimum in other specialties, neonatology represents the last of the ''low hanging fruit'' for managed care.
EVALUATING A MCO
In evaluating a managed care contract offered to your group, it is essential to evaluate the organization that is offering the contract, as well as the terms of the contract. The nature and extent of your review should depend on the volume of business the contract in question is likely to generate.
Often, the company that offers the contract is a subsidiary of a larger company. Make sure your financial due diligence is directed to the entity that will be a party to the contract, and not to its larger and presumably more solvent parent corporation. In evaluating that company's financial condition, consider the following numbers and ratios (the parenthetical information listed below reflects suggested guidelines from Special report: the health of HMOs, Phys Netw Insider, March 6, 1998):
1. net worth ($250,000-500,000); 2. profit margin, i.e., net income divided by total revenue (greater than or equal to 2%); 3. current ratio, i.e., current assets divided by current liabilities (1:1 or better); 4. health care expense ratio, i.e., health care expense divided by total health care revenue (70-92%); 5. debt ratio, i.e., total liabilities divided by total assets (less than or equal to 75%); 6. cash flow-to-debt ratio (greater than or equal to 20%); 7. enrollment trends (be cautious if enrollment is shrinking, or if it is growing very rapidly); 8. patient days per thousand.
Nonfinancial issues also should play a role in your evaluation. Consider looking at the following issues:
1. Does the plan have NCQA accreditation? 2. Does the plan collect HEDIS data? 3. Evaluate the experience of the management team.
4. Identify, and evaluate the experience of, the medical director. 5. Review and evaluate the plan's provider panel, including physicians, hospitals and ancillary providers. 6. Contact friends and acquaintances on the provider panel to inquire about the plan's payment practices, administrative requirements, etc. 7. Review the plan's member demographics. 8. Review the plan's litigation history.
Information regarding a MCO can be obtained from a variety of sources. Many MCOs, particularly those that are publicly traded, will provide you with the information you request. In addition, federally qualified MCOs must submit certain financial information to HCFA's Office of Managed Care in Washington, DC. MCOs also have to submit financial and other information to state insurance departments, and much of what they submit is available to the public. Finally, the Health Care Insurance Association in Baltimore, MD, is a good resource for information regarding MCOs.
PHYSICIAN LIABILITY UNDER MANAGED CARE: AN UNCLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
Despite scant and equivocal evidence in support of the proposition that managed care results in decreased health care costs, employers, the federal government and others who control the flow of patients and dollars appear to have accepted this proposition as fact. As a result, physicians throughout the country need to accept the fact that managed care ''penetration'' is going to increase. This situation has a great many implications for physicians, one of which is that participation in managed care exposes physicians to an increased risk of liability under a variety of theories.
The health care landscape is changing rapidly, and development of the legal rules that set the parameters of this liability tends to lag behind changes in the market. Consequently, while there is no doubt that physicians are exposed to an increased risk of liability as a result of their participation in managed care, the precise nature and scope of the risk are far from clear.
This portion of the article will address aspects of managed care that may result in increased liability for physicians. A subsequent article will identify and discuss briefly some of the theories of liability that are being asserted against physicians who participate in managed care, and will offer thoughts on how some of these risks can be managed.
Managed Care Liability -Theoretical Bases
Prior to managed care, a physician's legal obligations to his or her patients arose out of the physician-patient relationship, and these obligations were defined by common law theories applicable to the physician-patient relationship. Basically, if the physician failed to act reasonably in treating the patient, and if the patient was injured as a result, the physician was subject to liability. Managed care affects a physician's relationship with his or her patients. Typically, this effect arises out of a contract between the managed care plan and the physician. It is not uncommon for these contracts to impose new obligations on physicians, such as where the managed care contract requires the physician to advise the patient of the patient's appeal rights in the event of an adverse utilization management decision. More troubling, however, is the fact that occasionally the managed care contract imposes obligations on the physician that may be inconsistent with the physician's common law obligations to the patient (see, e.g., Rodwin. Conflicts in managed care. N Engl J Med 1995; 604:332) . In this setting, it is important for physicians to remember that while a managed care contract can increase the physician's obligations to the patient, that contract cannot decrease or limit the physician's obligations to the patient.
Managed Care Liability -Practical Considerations
From a practical standpoint, participation in managed care can increase physician liability in two ways. First, utilization management activities by the managed care plan, even when conducted appropriately, may reduce the physician's margin for error when making certain treatment decisions, e.g., when to discharge a postoperative patient from the hospital. Consequently, it is likely that even the best utilization management programs result in at least some increased risk of a bad outcome, which is the threshold element of most malpractice actions.
Second, for a variety of reasons, many patients find their managed care experience to be less than ideal. At least in some circumstances, this leads to an adversarial attitude in which a bad outcome is more likely to lead to a lawsuit. Even though the patient blames the HMO for the outcome, the physician is likely to be sued as well. Given some of the staggering verdicts that have been returned against HMOs in cases arising out of utilization management decisions, the risk of ''collateral damage'' to physicians is great.
One of the reasons why physicians may be sued where a bad outcome results from a utilization management decision can be found in the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (''ERISA''). Congress adopted ERISA in 1974 to protect participants in employer-and union-sponsored pension and benefit plans. Since employer-and union-sponsored health plans are a leading source of payment for health services, ERISA applies to many managed care plans.
In order to assure uniform application of the ERISA protections, Congress established what is known as the ERISA ''preemption'' provisions, under which ERISA supersedes any state laws that ''relate to any employee benefits plan.'' As a result of this preemption, many claims against MCOs that would otherwise be governed by traditional tort law, including medical malpractice actions, are governed by ERISA.
Under ERISA, a patient who claims that he or she was improperly denied a benefit is only entitled to recover the value of the benefit. For example, if a plaintiff claims that an ERISA plan improperly refused to authorize a diagnostic test, which refusal led to an adverse outcome, the plaintiff's recovery would be limited to the cost of the test. Consequently, as a practical matter, if a claim against a managed care plan is deemed to be governed by ERISA, the plaintiff's recovery is likely to be insignificant. This protection afforded to managed care plans governed by ERISA leaves physicians as the only viable target in many cases of this type.
The ERISA preemption doctrine has been eroded in recent years (see, e.g., A ruling that may help you win more UR disputes. Med Econ 1995;32). The doctrine still provides significant protection for MCOs in most parts of the country, however.
Another way in which managed care increases the risk of physician liability is through the use of financial incentives to control costs. This arrangement, despite its merits, creates an environment in which patients and their attorneys are more likely to ask ''Whose side are you on?'' when the physician makes a treatment decision that has financial implications. In this environment, it is not uncommon for a garden variety medical malpractice case to include claims that the physician's treatment decisions were based on financial considerations instead of the best interests of the patient.
Conclusion
For those who feel that managed care is likely to become a fact of life in neonatology, the next article in this series will address specific theories of liability for physicians participating in managed care. The final article will address specific contract provisions for those who are willing (or compelled) to face the potential legal and business risks associated with managed care.
Theories of Liability Under Managed Care -Part 2

INTRODUCTION
This is the second in a series of four articles dealing with the impact of managed care on the practice of neonatology. The prior article dealt with the question of whether managed care is likely to continue making inroads in neonatology, offered suggestions on evaluating managed care companies and discussed some of the reasons why physicians who participate in managed care are at increased risk for liability claims. This article will discuss specific theories of physician liability under managed care.
Liability for Treatment Decisions -Acquiescence in Plan Utilization Management Decisions One of the most common sources of liability and frustration associated with managed care arises out of the tension between the physician's judgment regarding the appropriate course of treatment, and the Plan's utilization management policies and decisions. The physician's potential exposure to liability in this area is heightened by the fact that many Plans operate under the protections afforded by ERISA, as described in the prior article. Plans often seek to further insulate themselves from liability for utilization management decisions by contending that these decisions are benefit determinations, as opposed to treatment decisions. To reinforce this position, Plans often insist on a contract provision stating: ''Nothing in this agreement. . . shall be construed to interfere with or in any way affect a physician's obligation to exercise independent medical judgment.'' As a result of these factors, physicians may be the only viable defendants in the event a utilization management decision leads to an adverse patient outcome.
Some utilization management disputes can be avoided through more detailed charting and more effective and amicable communication with Plan representatives. If, despite your best efforts, the Plan refuses to authorize treatment that you believe to be in the patient's best interests, there are steps you can take to reduce the risk of a claim against you. These steps can be summarized as follows: This multistep approach is time-consuming and not without risk, but it has a number of benefits. First, it provides the patient with sufficient information to give an informed consent, thereby reducing your potential exposure under that theory of liability. Second, the discussion makes the patient aware of your recommendation and of the Plan's involvement in the decision-making process. This may reduce the likelihood that you will be sued if things go awry (although the ERISA preemption available to employer-sponsored health plans may leave you as the only viable defendant). If you are sued, the discussion and documentation will make your case easier to defend.
Liability for Patient Care Decisions -Financial Incentives
An increasing number of ''garden variety'' malpractice suits include claims that the physician's treatment decisions were based on financial considerations, instead of the patient's best interests. Plaintiffs' attorneys in these cases seek to determine the existence and nature of any financial incentives that might affect treatment decisions. Unlike the claims described above, these claims do not depend on an allegation that the physician's decision was affected directly by a Plan's utilization management decision. Rather, these plaintiffs argue that the physician's financial self-interest dictated treatment decisions.
These claims typically arise in cases where the plaintiffs' expert witness is of the opinion that the defendant physician breached the standard of care by failing to order a hospital admission, test or procedure, and where the ordering of that hospitalization, test or procedure would have had a financial impact on the defendant physician.
A slight variation on this theme is an informed consent claim, in which the patient contends that the physician had an obligation to disclose the fact of the financial incentives, or disincentives, that might affect treatment decisions. The potential risks associated with this type of ''conflict of interest'' claim have been discussed at length in both the legal and medical literature (see, e.g., Rodwin. Conflicts in managed care. N Engl J Med 1995; 604:332) .
If the plaintiff's attorney can persuade a jury that the physician's treatment decision was affected by financial considerations, there is a potential for an award of punitive damages, as well as compensatory damages. Historically, punitive damage awards have been extraordinarily rare in medical malpractice cases. Given the possibility of this type of claim, however, physicians should refer to their professional liability insurance policies to determine whether the policy provides coverage for punitive damages.
There are no easy ways to reduce the risk of claims of this type. Obviously, physicians should not let financial considerations enter into treatment decisions. This does not preclude the risk of this type of claim, however, and at present, the best protection is to ensure the availability of adequate insurance coverage.
Fortunately, this type of claim may become less common, at least in some states. For example, Arizona passed a statute that obligates Arizona health maintenance organizations to disclose and to describe ''provider compensation programs [that] include any incentives or penalties that are intended to encourage plan providers to withhold services or minimize or avoid referrals to specialists.'' Liability for Treatment Decisions -Clinical Practice Guidelines Clinical practice guidelines are becoming increasingly popular with MCOs, professional associations, federal agencies and other organizations. One of the major tenets of total quality management is a belief that a reduction in variation is essential to an improvement in quality. Consequently, clinical practice guidelines are used to standardize certain aspects of medical treatment, in the hopes that standardization will improve outcomes and control costs. Guidelines also are used to provide a framework for clinical decision making, to enable physicians to use recognized clinical experts as resources and to serve as educational tools. To date, more than 60 organizations have produced over 1600 clinical practice guidelines.
Unfortunately, clinical practice guidelines can increase liability risks in several ways. First, if a MCO implements clinical practice guidelines as part of its utilization management policy, physician compliance with the guidelines can, in the face of an adverse medical outcome, lead to a claim that the physician allowed his or her medical judgment to be swayed by the MCO.
Another potential liability risk occurs where a physician fails to comply with the Plan's clinical practice guidelines. Although very few guidelines are established for purposes of setting a standard of care, the guidelines may be used for that purpose at least under some circumstances. A study by the Harvard School of Public Health found that ''plaintiffs have thus far tended to make substantially greater use of guidelines to their advantage than have defendants'' (Hyams AL, Brandenburg JA, LipsiEz SR, Brennan TA. Practice guidelines and malpractice litigation. Report to Physician Payment Review Commission, Grant no. 92GO4). As guidelines continue to proliferate, there is an increased risk that they will become traps for the unwary.
Again, there is no way to eliminate the risks associated with the increased use of clinical practice guidelines. There are some ways to reduce the risk, however. One simplistic but potentially effective way to reduce the risk is to exercise caution and foresight in drafting the guidelines. If a guideline is entitled, e.g., ''Suggested Management for Typical Presentations of Gestational Diabetes,'' a deviation from that suggestion is less likely to be viewed as a breach of the standard of care, as compared to a guideline entitled ''Standards of Practice for Management of Gestational Diabetes.'' Another way to reduce the risks associated with a deviation from clinical practice guidelines is to document your awareness of the guidelines and your reasons for choosing not to follow them. For example, if a guideline recommends the use of a particular medication, and you decide to use a different medication, you might want to document your thought process as follows: ''Have decided to prescribe 'brand x' despite practice guideline recommendation because of patient's presentation including the following factors . . .'' While this type of charting will not preclude a claim against you, it will make it impossible for anyone to argue that you are not familiar with the guidelines, or that your failure to adhere to them was the result of inadvertence or oversight, as opposed to professional judgment.
Liability for Participation in UM/QM and Other Plan Activities
Many managed care contracts obligate physicians to participate in utilization management, peer review and other activities that can give rise to claims against the physicians by plan beneficiaries and, on occasion, by other participating physicians. For example, if a physician makes a prospective utilization management decision on behalf of the Plan, and that decision contributes to an adverse outcome, there is a possibility of a claim against the physician who made the UM decision. Similarly, if a physician participates in credentialing or peer review activities on behalf of a Plan, and another physician is excluded or ejected from the Plan as a result, the affected physician could bring suit against the individual physician and others under a variety of theories, including the antitrust laws.
Although federal and state statutes may provide some level of protection from claims arising out of such activities, the protections afforded physicians are not absolute, and they may be of limited practical value. In addition, coverage for these types of claims typically is not available under traditional professional liability insurance policies. Consequently, if a physician will be obligated to provide credentialing, peer review, utilization review or other services under the managed care contract, the Plan should insure or indemnify the physician for claims arising out of those activities. As a general rule, insurance is preferable to indemnity, since the applicability of indemnity provisions is frequently the subject of litigation, resulting in a significant cost burden on the physician. In addition, an indemnity provision ties the fate of the physician to the financial well being of the Plan.
Participation in credentialing, utilization management and quality management activities can also lead to administrative problems for physicians. For example, the medical director of an Arizona HMO was investigated by the Board of Medical Examiners following a complaint regarding the director's refusal to approve gall bladder surgery for a woman enrolled in an HMO. The Board issued a letter of concern to the medical director, and the insurer and the medical director brought suit to overturn the Board's decision, arguing that the Board did not have jurisdiction over the dispute because the medical director's actions were administrative decisions, as opposed to medical decisions.
The trial judge agreed with the Board's position, and the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's ruling. The Arizona Supreme Court subsequently declined to review the case, allowing the trial court ruling to stand.
If other courts follow the analysis employed by the trial judge in this case, concurrent and prospective utilization management decisions on behalf of a managed care plan may result in BOMEX investigations and, where appropriate, sanctions. In addition, where the utilization management activities involve concurrent or prospective review, the physician should confirm that the Plan's program complies with, or is exempt from, the provisions of the state's utilization review certification statute, if any.
Liabilities Associated With Termination of the Managed Care Contract
Most current managed care contracts allow the Plan or the physician to terminate the contract, without cause, on relatively short notice. When this occurs, there is a risk that the Plan's beneficiaries will ''fall through the cracks'' as responsibility for their care is transferred from the physician whose contract was terminated to another physician. This risk is particularly acute where patients are under active treatment, and where the managed care contract restricts the physician's ability to communicate with the patient regarding the termination.
Typically, the managed care contract obligates the Plan to arrange for the transfer of responsibility of the patient's care to another physician. Remember, however, that this language does not reduce the physician's obligation to exercise reasonable care for the patient's benefit. If the Plan fails to arrange for the transfer of responsibility for the patient's care in a timely fashion, and an adverse outcome results, the physician whose contract was terminated is still subject to a claim for malpractice based on allegations of ''abandonment.'' Some managed care contracts compound this problem by restricting the physician's ability to communicate with patients regarding the termination, or the reasons for the termination. This approach places the patient, the physician and the Plan at risk during the transition period following termination of the contract.
One way to reduce the risk of this type of problem is to carefully review managed care contracts to identify these provisions, and to modify them where possible. At a minimum, you should preserve your right to make whatever patient contacts you believe are necessary to ensure continuity of care. You should also seek indemnity from the Plan for any claims that arise out of the Plan's mishandling of the transfer of responsibility for patient care. Finally, you should ensure that the contract allows you to continue to treat affected patients, and to be reimbursed for their care, until responsibility for their care has been transferred.
Liability Associated With ''Firing'' Troublesome Patients
In the absence of a contractual agreement to the contrary, physicians have the right to terminate their relationship with a particular patient under most circumstances, provided the physician allows the patient a reasonable opportunity to make arrangements to transfer responsibility for care to another physician. Typically, the best way to do this is through a face-to-face or telephone conversation with the patient, followed by a letter advising the patient of the termination. The patient should also be advised that the physician remains willing to provide care as needed for a reasonable period of time, usually 30 days or so. The letter should be sent certified mail, return receipt requested.
Some managed care contracts restrict the physician's right to terminate. Because troublesome patients are often litigious, the physician's inability to terminate his or her relationship with these patients increases the risk of being sued. To address this potential problem, the physician should review the managed care contract to determine what restrictions are placed on his or her ability to terminate a patient. A physician should attempt to have a provision included in the contract explicitly stating that the physician may terminate a patient upon reasonable notice to the patient and the Plan.
Even where the physician is successful in obtaining the contractual right to terminate, however, the physician needs to remember that he or she must comply with all other professional and legal requirements in order to avoid liability to the patient in the event of an adverse outcome during the transition phase.
Liability for Collective Physician Activities in Response to Managed Care Plan Conduct
One of the most significant effects of managed care is that it has substantially altered the bargaining position of physicians. In a recent criminal antitrust case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized this development and suggested the possibility that physicians should be allowed to engage in certain types of collective activities in order to level the playing field:
Medical plans serve, effectively, as the bargaining agents for large groups of consumers; they use the clout of their consumer base to drive down health care service fees. Uniform fee schedulesanathema in a normal, competitive marketare standard operating procedure when medical Plans are involved. In light of these departures from a normal competitive market, individual health care providers are entitled to take some joint action (short of price fixing or a group boycott) to level the bargaining imbalance created by the Plans and provide meaningful input into the setting of the fee schedules. United States versus Aston, 947 E2d 1206 (9ch Cir. 1992).
Unfortunately, the line dividing permissible collective efforts from conduct that violates the antitrust laws is difficult to discern. As a result, seemingly benign conduct can have devastating consequences. For example, the defendants in the Alston case, cited above, were dentists who were concerned about the fact that copayments had not risen in their market for nearly 10 years. The United States Attorney's office claimed that the defendants had violated the antitrust laws by encouraging other dentists to request higher copayment fees from managed care plans. Following a protracted and undoubtedly expensive criminal proceeding, all three defendants were convicted of criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently reversed their conviction, the case could hardly be called a victory for the affected health care providers.
Obviously, the best way to minimize the risk of this type of liability is to refrain from conduct that violates the antitrust laws. A discussion of what is and is not permissible under the antitrust laws exceeds the scope of this article. A reasonably lucid discussion of the antitrust law applicable to the formation of physician networks can be found in the Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, issued by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, August 1996. Other than this reference, however, the best advice that can be given on this point in the space permitted (albeit self-serving advice from an attorneys standpoint) is to consult with an attorney before engaging in collective activities, such as information sharing, collective negotiations and similar activities, with other physicians.
CONCLUSION
This article is by no means an exhaustive discussion of the legal risks associated with participation in managed care. Physicians must scrutinize proposed managed care contracts, identifying problematic contract provisions and, where possible, negotiating alternative provisions. In addition, physicians should ensure that they have liability insurance or indemnity protection against these risks.
The next and final article in this series will discuss common managed care contract provisions. It also will provide a discussion of developing case law relating to some of those provisions, and it will offer suggestions on how risks associated with those provisions may be reduced.
MANAGED CARE CONTRACTS: RISK AND SUGGESTIONS
Risk is an integral part of managed care, where terms such as ''risk shifting,'' ''risk contract'' and ''risk pool'' abound. A physician who participates in managed care cannot eliminate the risks associated with that participation, any more than a physician can eliminate the risk of a bad patient outcome.
Although managed care risks can never be eliminated, a careful review of a proposed managed care contract should lead to identification and evaluation of these risks. Once the risks have been identified, some of them may be eliminated or at least minimized during contract negotiations. Those risks that cannot be eliminated can be assessed, so the physician can make an informed judgment as to whether the anticipated benefits of the contract outweigh the risks.
Managed care contracts are lengthy and seemingly impenetrable, and many physicians recoil at the prospect of having to review and understand these contracts. Although review of these contracts is not pleasant, failure to undertake a careful review may expose a physician to significant unknown, and even uninsured, liabilities. The Selected Managed Care Contract Provisions section lists some of the more problematic managed care contract provisions and contains a brief discussion of the issues that arise from those provisions.
SELECTED MANAGED CARE CONTRACT PROVISIONS Indemnification/Hold Harmless Provisions
These provisions attempt to allocate legal risk for certain untoward events (usually professional liability claims) between the physician and the MCO. A fairly even-handed version of this type of provision looks something like the following.
Indemnification: In the event a MCO is sued solely as a result of physician's negligence, physician agrees to defend and indemnify MCO. In the event physician is sued solely as a result of MCO's negligence, MCO agrees to defend and indemnify physician.
This provision merely documents what the law requires in most states, i.e., if a MCO is sued because of a physician's conduct, the physician is responsible for defending and indemnifying the MCO. In some markets, however, MCOs attempt to insert a different type of indemnification provision in their managed care contracts. That provision might read as follows.
Indemnification: Physician agrees to defend, indemnify and hold harmless MCO from all liability arising out of physician's provision of services under this contract.
In some states, this type of provision might obligate the physician to defend and indemnify the MCO from certain claims, even if those claims are based, or in part, on the MCO's conduct. In effect, the physician becomes the insurer of the MCO. This type of provision significantly expands a physician's potential liability (i.e., the physician is accepting liability for the MCO's conduct). Worse, professional liability insurance carriers typically exclude coverage of this additional liability, so the physician ends up defending and indemnifying the MCO at his or her own expense. Another problem with this provision is that the physician's obligation to defend and indemnify the MCO continues even after the managed care contract in question is terminated.
Obligation to Comply With MCO Policies and Procedures
Virtually every managed care contract obligates participating physicians to comply with the MCO's utilization management, quality management, credentialing, claims submission, record keeping and grievance procedures. As a threshold matter, physicians should not sign managed care contracts obligating them to comply with these procedures until the physicians have obtained and reviewed the MCO documents that set forth the procedures. The physician should also ensure that the MCO cannot unilaterally amend these procedures without written notice to the physician, and without giving the physician an opportunity to either opt out of the amendment or to terminate the managed care contract.
All managed care contracts obligate the physician to comply with the MCO's utilization management policies and procedures. Usually, these policies and procedures are set forth in ancillary documents, and the MCO reserves the right to amend those documents.
Compliance with utilization management Physician agrees to comply with all of MCO's utilization management policies and procedures, including policies and procedures set forth in MCO's utilization management handbook, as amended from time to time.
Whenever a managed care contract obligates a physician to comply with ancillary documents that are not included as part of the contract, it is essential for the physician to obtain and review those documents. Also, if the MCO reserves the right to amend those documents, the physician should insist on receiving notice of any proposed amendments, and should seek the opportunity to opt out of the amendment or to terminate the contract if the MCO does not agree to an opt out arrangement.
Despite the MCO's pervasive quality management and utilization management requirements, and the elaborate disciplinary processes that are invoked when physicians fail to meet those requirements, managed care contracts always include a provision stating that all medical decisions, and any liability associated with those decisions, are the responsibility of the physician.
Responsibility for professional decisions
Nothing in this agreement, including physician's participation in the Quality Management and Utilization Management process, shall be construed to interfere with or in any way affect physician's obligation to exercise independent medical judgment in rendering health care services to participants.
MCOs try to distance themselves from medical decision making, and the potential liability associated with medical decision making, by arguing that they make benefits decisions, not medical decisions. In recent years, a number of courts have declined to follow this reasoning, and have allowed MCOs to be held liable for the consequences of medical decision making. In addition, the Board of Medical Examiners in one state, Arizona, determined that the medical director of a health plan was subject to Board discipline for decisions made by the medical director as part of the health plan's utilization management process.
Term and Termination Provisions
Managed care contracts invariably set forth the term of the contract. Many managed care contracts also have automatic renewal provisions. These provisions state that the contract will automatically renew at the end of each term unless either party provides the other with written notice of an intent not to renew.
Term
The term of this agreement shall begin on the effective date of this agreement and continue through the last day of June 1998, unless otherwise terminated.
Automatic renewal
This agreement shall be automatically renewed for successive one (1)-year terms, without additions or modifications of its terms, unless either party shall provide the other with written notice of its intent to terminate this agreement. This notice must be received by the Notifying Party at least ninety (90) days prior to the expiration of the initial or any succeeding term of this agreement.
Upon reviewing the term and renewal provisions, many physicians presume that by signing the managed care contract, they are entering into a ''long-term'' relationship with the MCO, for better or worse. This usually is not the case, however, because many, if not most, managed care contracts allow either the physician or the MCO to terminate the contract ''without cause'' on relatively short notice, e.g., 30 to 60 days.
Termination without cause
Either MCO or physician may terminate this agreement without cause upon thirty (30) days' written notice to the other party.
''Without cause'' termination provisions have been the subject of much controversy and discussion. MCOs claim they need maximum flexibility in making termination decisions. Many physicians contend that an MCO's decision to terminate should entitle the affected physician to certain due process rights, or at least an explanation of the reason for the termination.
Physicians whose contracts were terminated without cause had some recent success in litigation. In 1996, the New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled that a physician had the right to challenge an MCO's termination of his contract without cause, on the rounds that the termination breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. In 1997, the California Court of Appeals ruled a physician had a ''common law right to fair procedure before [the MCO] could terminate his membership in its health care provider networks.'' On the legislative front, more than 12 states passed laws affecting an MCO's ability to terminate physicians without cause.
Despite these successes, most MCOs can terminate physicians without cause, and with little or no explanation as to the reason for the termination. In addition, many of the laws and court decisions that provide physicians with some protection from termination without cause do not preclude MCOs from refusing to renew physicians' managed care contracts.
In many situations, physicians may prefer a provision that allows the contract to be terminated without cause on fairly short notice. This provision gives the physician an opportunity to ''test waters'' with a new MCO before committing to a long-term relationship.
Most managed care contracts include a provision allowing either party to terminate the contract in the event of a material breach of the contract by the other party. Most contracts also allow a ''notice and cure'' period, which gives the breaching party an opportunity to cure the breach so as to avoid termination of the contract.
Material breach -notice and cure
Either party may terminate this agreement by providing the other party with a minimum of thirty (30) days' prior written notice in the event the other party commits a material breach of any provision of this agreement.
Most contracts also provide the MCO with the right to terminate an agreement immediately without a notice and cure period, where the reason for the termination threatens patient care or exposes the MCO to potential liability.
Immediate termination MCO may terminate this agreement immediately upon the occurrence of any of the following events:
(A) physician's conviction of a felony; (B) professional incompetence; (C) physician's failure to comply with standards established by MCO; (D) physician's addiction to alcohol, narcotics or other drugs, or any physical disability which impairs physician's ability to practice his/her profession in a competent manner; (E) physician's loss or suspension of licenses necessary for the performance of physician's services under this agreement; (F) physician's failure to maintain membership on the medical staff of the hospitals listed on exhibit; (G) physician's failure to maintain professional liability and general liability insurance as required under this agreement; (H) physician's being a defendant in a malpractice proceeding that results in substantial judgments, settlements or awards against the physician; or (I) physician's direct contact of MCO members in regard to matters pertaining to MCO plans without MCO's prior written approval, or physician's making any disparaging remarks about MCO or expressing opinions regarding MCO or any of its affiliates that are negative in nature.
Payment Provisions
Virtually every managed care contract prohibits the participating physicians from billing the MCO's members for covered services. This prohibition applies even where the MCO is unable or unwilling to pay for the physician's services.
Prohibition against billing members No charges. Physician shall not bill MCO members for any covered services provided by physician to members under this agreement, except for applicable copayments and deductible amounts. Physician will not, under any circumstances, including nonpayment by MCO, the insolvency of MCO, or breach or termination of this agreement by MCO, seek compensation from, have any recourse against or impose any additional charge on any MCO member.
To the surprise of many physicians, managed care contracts often do not include a provision obligating the MCO to pay the physician for services he or she provides to the MCO's beneficiaries. Instead, many contracts identify the MCO as a ''broker'' who will enter into contracts with employers, health plans and other ''payors'' who will be responsible for paying for the physician services.
Physician reimbursement. MCO shall contract, directly or indirectly, with payors who agree to pay in accordance with this Agreement for covered services rendered by physician. MCO shall, upon specific request by physician, identify the payor responsible for payment for covered services.
Unfortunately, since the physician typically does not have a written contract with the ''payors,'' and since the physician usually agrees not to pursue the beneficiaries in the event of nonpayment by the MCO, the physician may be left without a remedy if the MCO does not pay the physician. There are ways to negotiate additional protections for the physician, but where physicians enter into contracts with this type of payment language, the physicians should monitor their contract accounts receivable very carefully.
Those managed care contracts that do specifically obligate the MCO to pay the physician for services rendered often provide the MCO with a fair amount of flexibility regarding the timing of that payment.
Timing of payment. Amounts due physician under this agreement shall be paid to physician within thirty (30) days after receipt of a complete, clean claim satisfactory to MCO, unless additional information is requested by a payor within the thirty (30)-day period, or the claim involves coordination of benefits, or as otherwise provided in the Application Program Attachments.
To provide maximum protection for physicians, the contract should: (1) clearly define what constitutes a ''complete, clean claim;'' (2) state that claims will be deemed to be ''complete and clean'' unless the MCO notifies the physician that additional information is needed within fifteen (15) days after submission; (3) obligate the MCO to pay complete, clean claims within thirty (30) days after submission; and, (4) where the physician has sufficient bargaining power, obligate the MCO to pay interest or a late charge where the physician is not paid in a timely fashion.
Gag Clauses
MCOs have come to recognize that many physicians do not fully embrace the concept of managed care, and that physicians might be inclined to make disparaging remarks about managed care in general and about the patient's MCO in particular. As a result, managed care contracts offered by many MCOs began to include provisions restricting physicians' ability to communicate with patients. Some of these provisions prohibited physicians from making disparaging or derogatory remarks about the MCO.
Nonsolicitation of members
During the term of this agreement, physician shall use his/her best efforts to ensure that no employee of physician or subcontractor of physician makes any derogatory remarks regarding MCO to any member.
Other provisions state that in the event the physician's contract with the MCO is terminated, the physician is precluded from talking to the MCO's members about that termination.
Prohibition against contact with members
Physician has been advised that MCO has expended a great deal of time, effort and money in developing its business and obtaining the members that are enrolled with MCO. Understanding this, physician expressly waives physician's right to contact MCO members in any way about the termination of this agreement, including those members who are patients of the physician, and physician expressly agrees not to communicate in any form or manner with such members. Physician agrees to rely exclusively upon MCO's communication to its members concerning the termination of this agreement and agrees not to interfere in any way with the relationship between MCO and its members.
Provisions prohibiting physicians from talking to members expose physicians to potential liability. Certain types of gag clauses have come under attack in recent years. For example, in a policy statement issued on December 9, 1996, the Department of Health and Human Services advised health plans contracting with Medicare that gag clauses are illegal to the extent that they limit a physician's ability to talk to Medicare beneficiaries about medically necessary treatment options. Also in December of 1996, the American Association of Health Plans, a large managed care trade organization, announced that it would no longer use or promote gag clauses in managed care agreements. Despite these developments, some MCOs continue to attempt to limit physician communication with the MCO's members through the use of gag clauses.
Dispute Resolution
Many managed care contracts provide for some form of alternative dispute resolution. As a general proposition, alternative dispute resolution is preferable to litigation from the physician's standpoint, since the MCO's superior financial resources provide a more pronounced advantage in litigation. Arbitration is preferable, however, only if it is binding arbitration. Otherwise, if the physician prevails in the arbitration, the MCO would have the right to initiate litigation in hopes of obtaining a different result. This would force the physician to incur costs associated with both proceedings.
Should any dispute arise between the parties over any provision of this agreement or over either party's performance of its obligations under this agreement, the dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration. This arbitration shall be conducted in [city] , [state] , in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration Association for Commercial Disputes. During the arbitration, each party shall equally contribute to the costs of the arbitration and each party shall bear its own attorneys' fees. Upon an award by the arbitrator, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its share of arbitration costs expended, and all its other costs, including its attorneys' fees. A judgment on the arbitration award may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction.
Assignment of Contract Rights and Obligations
Assignment allows a party to a contract to transfer its rights and/or obligations under the contract to another party. MCOs always preclude physicians from assigning their contract rights, and they try to retain their own ability to assign the contract. Where an MCO retains the right to assign a contract to a third party, physicians face the risk that all of the due diligence that was done prior to entering into the contract will be wasted, since the third party will not necessarily have the experience, financial resources and other attributes the physician relied upon in entering into a contract with the MCO. One way to reduce this risk is to require the MCO to give the physician adequate notice of an intent to assign the contract and to allow the physician to terminate the contract if the physician has concerns about the party to whom the contract is being assigned.
The rights and/or obligations of the parties under this agreement may not be assigned, delegated, transferred, conveyed or sold without the prior written consent of the other party, except that MCO may assign, delegate, transfer, convey or sell its rights and/or obligations to a parent, subsidiary or affiliate or to an entity into which MCO is merged or with which MCO is consolidated, or to a purchaser of all or substantially all of MCO's assets or as part of a corporate reorganization.
Amendment of the Contract
After the contract has been signed, it may be subject to amendment, which can occur in several ways. One potential problem relating to amendment of the contract is that the contract usually obligates the physician to comply with ancillary documents, such as utilization management manuals, quality management procedures, etc. Often the contract allows the MCO to amend these ancillary documents unilaterally. Where the contract allows the MCO to amend the agreement or the ancillary documents unilaterally, physicians should insist on language that obligates the MCO to give the physician written notice of the proposed amendments, along with an opportunity to opt out of the amendment or terminate the agreement. Amendment MCO may amend this agreement or any of the ancillary documents by providing prior written notice to physician. Failure of physician to object in writing to any such proposed amendment within thirty (30) days following receipt of notice shall constitute physician's acceptance thereof. Notification to MCO of rejection of any proposed amendment means that this agreement shall remain in force without the proposed amendment.
In light of all of the regulatory changes affecting health care, many managed care contracts now include a provision allowing the contract to be amended if its terms violate applicable federal or state law. While this is an appropriate reason to amend a contract, MCOs often draft these provisions in a way that gives them a unilateral right to amend or terminate the contract if the MCO ''determines'' that some aspect of the contract might violate applicable law. This provision gives the MCO a great deal of latitude by allowing it to amend or terminate the contract based on minor, theoretical regulatory compliance issues.
Regulatory amendment
If MCO determines that any provision of this agreement may violate any applicable federal, state or local statute or regulation including without limitation statutes and regulations pertaining to Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement, such that the terms of this agreement must be changed accordingly, then upon receipt of notice from MCO to physician, the agreement shall, at MCO's option, be terminated or modified to bring it into compliance with such law or regulation.
CONCLUSION
Typically, MCOs will tell you that their contracts are nonnegotiable. This may or may not be true, depending upon your market position and other factors. It never hurts to at least try to modify problematic provisions. Where those efforts are unsuccessful, it will be essential to evaluate the risks posed by those provisions, and to make an informed decision as to whether the benefits of participating in the contract outweigh those risks.
MANAGED CARE: WHAT NEXT?
This is the fourth in a series of articles regarding managed care contracting issues. In recognition of the fact that most physician groups have little or no bargaining power when dealing with MCOs, health maintenance organizations and other health care financing entities (collectively, ''HMOs''), the first three articles focused on the evaluation of legal risks associated with common provisions in managed care contracts. Physicians who understand these risks can then make an informed business decision as to whether the rewards associated with the contracts, i.e., patients and reimbursement, outweigh the legal risks.
The purpose of this article is to identify and evaluate trends that are perceived as offering an opportunity to equalize the relative bargaining positions of physicians and HMOs. Physicians who are able to anticipate and prepare for the changes that may result from these trends will be better able to increase the rewards and decrease the risks associated with participation in managed care.
Problems Associated With Managed Care: A Brief Overview A prolonged discussion of the problems associated with managed care would serve no purpose except to further depress an already morose physician audience. A brief discussion may prove helpful, however, since it can serve as framework for discussing trends that appear to offer the most promise in fixing those problems. To that end, the following is a brief discussion of those few items that appear, from a purely personal and subjective viewpoint, to result in the most common physician complaints about managed care.
Decreased reimbursement
While there is a lively, ongoing debate about whether managed care has succeeded in controlling health care costs, even the most ardent supporter of our current form of managed care would have to concede that to the extent managed care has reduced health care costs, it has done so primarily by reducing reimbursement to providers. Very few HMOs have achieved cost savings through meaningful health management; perhaps a more accurate acronym for these companies would be RMOs -Reimbursement Management Organizations.
Decreased physician autonomy
To the extent HMOs have tried their hands at health management, their efforts have been focused, if not fixated, exclusively on denials of care for patients seeking treatment, as opposed to health management or maintenance for people at increased risk for health problems. As a result of this approach, physicians frequently are frustrated by detailed scrutiny and second-guessing of their treatment decisions. The frustration is compounded by the fact that the individuals who perform this review often are unqualified individuals working off cookbook treatment algorithms. Even where the reviewer is an appropriately qualified physician, treating physicians are concerned about having their decisions reversed by a physician who does not have a relationship with the patient or, for reasons discussed below, a comparable exposure to malpractice liability if things go wrong.
Decreased patient satisfaction
Surveys conducted by a variety of interested (i.e., biased) parties demonstrate conclusively that most HMO patients are very satisfied with the care they receive. Of course, surveys conducted by other interested (i.e., just as biased in the opposite direction) parties demonstrate just as conclusively that most HMO patients are dissatisfied or disgusted with the way their care is administered. It is clear, however, that many physicians perceive that their HMO patients are frustrated, suspicious and downright angry about their dealings with the HMO. There also is some evidence that HMOs share that perception. For example, if HMOs believe that most of their patients are happy with the HMOs performance, why do these HMOs insist on nondisparagement clauses in their contracts with physicians? Could it be that the HMOs fear that their members' attitudes might make them receptive to disparaging remarks?
Increased risk of liability Managed care contracts have the potential to increase physician liability in several ways. First, if the physician treating the patient is in the best position to make decisions about the appropriate course of care, any second-guessing of that physician's judgment increases the likelihood of a suboptimal outcome. Second, the risk of a claim arising from a suboptimal outcome is increased where the patient in question was dissatisfied with the way care was delivered. Third, certain types of reimbursement mechanisms have the potential for creating at least the perception of a conflict of interest between the physician and the patient, thereby exposing the physician to a claim based on an alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Finally (at least for purposes of this list), as a result of statutory protections afforded to HMOs, the treating physician may be the only viable defendant in the event of a bad outcome, regardless of the extent to which the HMO's conduct played a role in creating that outcome.
Why Do They Do What They Do?
HMOs insist on oppressive contract provisions because they have the bargaining power that allows them to do so. One reason for their superior bargaining position, particularly in the area of liability for bad outcomes, is the statutory protection they enjoy. A more important reason is that they have economic power, particularly as compared to the typical small physician practice or sole practitioner. This simple, but critical, fact was recognized by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States versus Alston, a case in which the court discussed the extent to which physicians could negotiate collectively with health plans:
Medical plans serve, effectively, as the bargaining agents for large groups of consumers; they use the clout of their consumer base to drive down health care service fees. Uniform fee schedulesanathema in a normal, competitive market -are standard operating procedure when medical plans are involved.
Given this economic fact of life, the search for trends that may level the playing field has led to two types of trends: those that weaken the bargaining power of the HMOs, and those that strengthen the power of physicians. The first group of trends has generated more optimism, possibly because these trends do not require any significant change in physician behavior. The second group of trends requires physicians to change certain behaviors. While this group of trends may prove more difficult in the short term, they probably offer the most long-term promise.
Trends That May Weaken HMOs' Bargaining Power
State and federal legislation The federal ''Patients' Bill of Rights''. The most prominent legislative initiatives affecting HMOs are the two bills drafted in response to President Clinton's request for a ''Patient's Bill of Rights.'' Both of the bills would guarantee emergency room access without prior HMO approval; safeguard personal information; allow physicians to discuss the full range of medical options with their patients; provide women with direct access to their obstetrician/ gynecologist; and provide for an independent review process to evaluate HMO decisions. The Democratic plan, HR 2723, also would allow states to permit patients to sue HMOs for improperly denying coverage.
Despite past missteps in this area, it appears likely that a compromise bill will pass some time soon. With the exception of the provision that would permit lawsuits against HMOs, however, the provisions in the proposed bills would not drastically after the balance of power between HMOs and physicians.
State legislation. Several states have passed legislation regulating HMOs. In 1997, Texas enacted the Health Care Liability Act. This act allows an individual to sue a health insurance carrier, health maintenance organization or other managed care entity for damages proximately caused by the entity's failure to exercise ordinary care when making a health care treatment decision. In addition, the act allows these entities to be held liable for substandard health care treatment decisions made by their employees, agents or representatives. The act also establishes an independent review process for adverse benefit determinations and requires an insured or enrollee to submit his or her claim challenging an adverse benefit determination to a review by an independent review organization, if such a review was requested by the managed care entity.
Immediately after the act was passed, Aetna Health Plans of Texas filed suit in the District Court, Southern District of Texas, claiming that the act was preempted by ERISA. Although the court determined that the act did not pertain to any ERISA benefit plan, it held that ERISA preempted certain provisions of the act because they were either related to or connected with an ERISA plan. Specifically, the court struck down the act's provisions, which established the independent review process for adverse benefit determinations and which preempted HMOs from firing doctors who advocated on a patient's behalf. In addition, the court struck down the act's provision which allowed an enrollee or insured to sue a managed care entity based on a benefits determination. The only provisions which survived the court's scrutiny were those which allowed insureds or enrollees to pursue claims against managed care entities based solely on ''quality of care'' concerns.
Both parties filed appeals to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which decided the Corcoran case, discussed below. To date, the Court of Appeals has not issued an opinion regarding the District Court's opinion.
HMO reform legislation has been proposed in a number of other states, including Arizona, California, Georgia, New Jersey and New York. As a result of different political climates and lobbying efforts, these bills have taken a variety of paths. In Arizona, for example, the primary feature of the new legislation is a provision that requires disclosure of basic information about an HMO's health care plan. For example, an HMO must disclose ''whether plan provider compensation programs include any incentives or penalties that are intended to encourage plan providers to withhold services or minimize or avoid referrals to specialists.'' Litigation Until recently, employer-sponsored health plans have enjoyed virtual immunity from liability for their benefits decisions, under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (''ERISA''). ERISA was originally designed to protect employee benefits plans, and it preempts state laws applicable to certain tort claims against ERISA plans. In the HMO setting, ERISA allows enrollees to bring suit against an HMO, but it limits their recovery to the cost of care the HMO refused to reimburse. Given the costs associated with litigation, this provision made litigation impractical in most situations.
Many courts have recognized that the application of ERISA to an enrollee's claim against an HMO mandates an unfair result. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressed its concerns about ERISA in Corcoran versus United Health Care. In that case, Mrs. Corcoran's obstetrician recommended complete bedrest during the final months of her pregnancy, and she applied to her employer for temporary disability benefits for the remainder of her pregnancy. That request was denied despite the recommendation of Mrs. Corcoran's obstetrician and another obstetrician from whom the employer sought a second opinion. As Mrs. Corcoran's delivery date neared, her obstetrician ordered hospitalization so he could monitor the fetus. The obstetrician sought precertification, which was denied. Subsequently, the fetus died.
Mrs. Corcoran and her husband brought a wrongful death action against the insurer. Although the Fifth Circuit's opinion suggests that the court was critical of the insurer's conduct, it felt compelled to apply the ERISA preemption to the Corcorans' claims:
The result ERISA compels us to reach means that the Corcorans have no remedy, state or federal, for what may have been a serious mistake. This is troubling for several reasons. First, it eliminates an important check on the thousands of medical decisions routinely made in the burgeoning utilization review system. . . Second, in any plan benefit determination, there is always some tension between the interests of the beneficiary in obtaining quality medical care and the interest of the plan in preserving the pool of funds available to compensate all beneficiaries. . .
Finally, cost-containing features such as the one at issue in this case did not exist when Congress passed ERISA. Fundamental changes such as the widespread institution of utilization review would seem to warrant a reevaluation of ERISA so that it can continue to serve its noble purpose of safeguarding the interests of employees.
Sympathetic courts can be receptive to innovative legal arguments. Currently, HMO enrollees are pursuing claims based on theories of vicarious liability (in which the treating physician is cast as an agent of the HMO, making the HMO responsible for the physician's conduct); breach of fiduciary duty (in which the HMO, as a fiduciary for the enrollee, has an obligation to disclose pertinent information, e.g., the existence of reimbursement mechanisms that may provide physicians with an incentive to minimize care); the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (''RICO''). In addition, claimants are making inroads against ERISA on straightforward tort claims.
The most widely publicized assault on ERISA preemption involves many of the same attorneys who sued the tobacco companies. These attorneys have filed class action lawsuits charging five of the largest HMOs with RICO violations. They are seeking class certification, which would enable them to bring claims on behalf of large numbers of HMO enrollees. For example, in a suit filed in California, the attorneys are seeking to represent the interests of all individuals who were enrolled in Aetna's commercial HMO plans since October of 1995. If certified, this class would include over 1,000,000 people.
In a press release decrying the class action lawsuits, Aetna's chief executive officer compared the plaintiffs' attorneys to wolves preying on ''weak buffaloes.'' While the physician community may take guilty pleasure in watching the attack, this trend, by itself, is unlikely to significantly weaken the bargaining power of HMOs. In addition, the trend may adversely impact physicians, since HMOs, plaintiffs or both are likely to contend that the treating physician played at least some role in the outcome that gave rise to the lawsuit.
Trends That May Strengthen Physician Bargaining Power
The primary source of the HMO's bargaining power is the fact, as noted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Alston, that they ''serve, effectively, as the bargaining agents for large groups of consumers; they use the clout of their consumer base to drive down health care service fees. '' In most cases, sole practitioners and physicians negotiating on behalf of small-to medium-sized group practices do not enjoy this type of leverage. Consequently, many physicians have sought to improve their leverage by seeking to negotiate on behalf of large numbers of physicians. These efforts have met with mixed results, but the methods by which physicians have sought to consolidate their bargaining power have continued to evolve. The Unionization, Lobbying for Modification of the Antitrust Rules and Consolidation of Physician Practices sections discuss trends that have been viewed as offering some promise in this area.
Unionization
In 1999, the AMA decided to form a national labor organization to represent employed physicians and some residents. The decision was made despite the opposition of the AMA's Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees had several concerns about the proposal, including the fact that fewer than 20% of the nation's physicians employees.
The AMA's efforts on behalf of employed physicians received a boost when the National Labor Relations Board ruled, in a 3:2 decision, that residents at private hospitals are employees, with the same right to unionize as residents at public hospitals. That ruling added nearly 100,000 residents to the ranks of potential physician union members.
Efforts to unionize employed physicians will not directly impact the nearly 80% of physicians who are self-employed. Several unions have attempted to enlist self-employed physicians in the union ranks, through two different approaches.
One approach, followed by the United Food and Commercial Workers Local 56, was to persuade the National Labor Relations Board that physicians under contract with AmeriHealth HMO were constructive employees of AmeriHealth, and therefore were entitled to collective bargaining rights under the National Labor Relations Act. In 1998, the NLRB Regional Director dismissed the union's petition on the grounds that the physicians were independent contractors, not employees. The union appealed the Regional Director's decision and the Board, on a 2:1 vote, remanded the case for a full hearing on the merits.
Following a 14-day hearing, the Regional Director again dismissed the petition. While she acknowledged that the relationship between the physicians and the HMO was ''complex,'' she cited the following factors in support of her ruling that the physicians were not employees:
o AmeriHealth lacked substantial control over the physical conduct of the physicians' services;
o AmeriHealth did not control the physicians' access to patients; o The physicians maintained ''economic separateness'' from AmeriHealth; o The physicians retained significant autonomy regarding how they operate their practices and generate profits; and, o The physicians had a ''meaningful opportunity'' to negotiate their fees and other contract terms.
The union filed a request for review of this decision by the NLRB. In October of 1999, the NLRB denied reviewed, thereby allowing the Regional Director's determination to stand.
Another way in which unions have offered their services to selfemployed physicians is through the use of the third party messenger model described in Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Healthcare issued jointly by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. Under the ''messenger model,'' as envisioned by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, third party messengers may facilitate collective negotiations between insurers and individual physicians or physician group practices. The messengers may not, however, enhance or improve the physicians' bargaining leverage. At least in the eyes of the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, the messenger merely serves as a conduit for transmission of proposed contract terms between the HMOs and individual physicians or physician groups.
Several unions have offered to act as messengers for physicians involved in negotiations with HMOs. In at least two cases, however, the Department of Justice has taken the position that the unions in fact were seeking to provide the physicians with additional bargaining leverage and were attempting to ''cloak their illegal activities as those of a legitimate third parry messenger.'' In one case, the DOJ's lawsuit was resolved through a stipulated judgment that severely curtailed the union's activities, in effect requiring them to comply with the DOJ's limited view of the proper role of a messenger. The other lawsuit, filed in Delaware, is still pending.
Lobbying for modification of the antitrust rules There has been a great deal of discussion, and some action, directed toward modifying federal and state antitrust law to create a new exception that would allow independent, self-employed physicians to negotiate collectively with HMOs. In 1999, Representative Tom Campbell of California introduced HR 1304, the Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 1999. That legislation, if passed, would have given health care professionals the right to negotiate collectively with HMOs under conditions and protections similar to those afforded to unions under the National Labor Relations Act. The bill received a hearing in the Judiciary Committee in June 1999, but no further action was taken.
Any attempt to create a special exception for physicians or other health care providers is likely to face stiff lobbying opposition from the HMO industry. In addition, representatives of the federal agencies charged with enforcement of the antitrust laws have expressed their opposition to the types of changes proposed in the Campbell bill. Opponents of this type of legislation argue that it would result in a significant increase in health care costs. They also contend that existing antitrust laws allow physicians and other healthcare providers to collaborate in many ways to negotiate collectively with HMOs (see Consolidation of Physician Practices section C, below). Arguments pro and con are set forth in great detail in written testimony introduced at the House Judiciary Committee hearing held on June 22, 1999.
Consolidation of physician practices
One physician-driven trend that held early promise for improving physician bargaining power was the movement toward independent practice associations, medical service organizations and, to a lesser extent, physician hospital organizations (collectively, ''IPAs''). Physicians who formed and joined these organizations hoped that they could achieve sufficient integration to enable them to bargain collectively without violating the antitrust prohibition against ''conspiracies in restraint of trade.'' This trend was given a boost when the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission released a series of Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care. While the statements did not liberalize the applicable antitrust principles, they do provide clearer guidance on what is required and what is permitted where physicians seek to negotiate collectively through an IPA.
Unfortunately, very few of these organizations have delivered on their initial promise. Several theories have evolved as to why IPAs have not been more successful. One factor that probably kept IPAs from realizing their potential is that most IPAs did not require any change in physician behavior.
For example, many IPAs do not set meaningful credentialing requirements for applicants; they do not establish quality management or utilization management processes; they are nonexclusive, which means that HMOs that are not able to negotiate a favorable contract with the IPA can attempt to negotiate directly with its participants; and, they do not develop the experience or infrastructure that is needed to manage risk contracts. These IPAs do not really bring physicians closer together; rather, the IPA acronym more accurately stands for ''I Practice Alone.'' Another trend toward consolidation, the evolution of physician practice management companies (''PPMCs''), was fueled by Wall Street's desire to profit from health care and by the desire of some physicians to cash out of their practices. The PPMC industry has seen an epidemic of failures in the last few years, probably because the management fees charged by the PPMCs exceeded the PPMCs' ability to increase revenue or cut expenses. A PPMC that focuses on neonatal practices, Pediatrix, has fared better than most. The recent performance of its stock, however, suggests that investors are no longer confident in this model.
Another trend towards consolidation is the formation, through merger or acquisition, of larger group practices. Unlike IPAS, these practices are fully integrated, and this integration frees them from concerns about the antitrust prohibition against conspiracies in restraint of trade (i.e., a fully integrated entity is viewed as a single entity that is incapable of conspiring with itself). While most of these group practices are single specialty organizations, some groups include physicians from different specialties who focus their practices on the management of a particular disease process or organ system, e.g., orthopedic surgeons, physiatrists and anesthesiologists working together to address musculo-skeletal problems.
Employer-driven trends Many employers, particularly large regional and national employers, have recognized that problems in the health care delivery system are increasing their costs and aggravating their employees. For example, following the November 1999 release of the Institute of Medicine's Report on problems in the health care system, a coalition of eight of the company's largest employers formed an organization to improve the quality of health care delivered to their employees. Other employers have formed coalitions to help control health care costs and to improve quality through a variety of measures, including publication of performance ''score cards'' for HMOs and health care providers.
HMO-driven changes
HMOs are aware of the performance and perception problems facing their industry. In response to some of the concerns outlined above, and in an effort to distinguish themselves in the eyes of employers and enrollees, some HMOs have instituted their own reforms. The most recent and noteworthy of these efforts involves UnitedHealth Group. According to some published reports, UnitedHealth Group realized that it spent more money on utilization management than it saved by denying approval for questionable care. As a result of this determination -and undoubtedly in an effort to distinguish itself from its competitors -UnitedHealth has decided that it no longer will require preapproval of most treatment decisions.
Other HMOs already were loosening the reins on certain types of care that did not appear to be subject to overutilization. Since UnitedHealth is the second largest HMO in the country, and since UnitedHealth received a tremendous amount of favorable publicity following its policy change, this trend may accelerate. The likely quid pro quo for this change will be an increased focus on retrospective review, including review of physician adherence with treatment protocols, and wide dissemination of report cards evaluating physician compliance with utilization and quality management guidelines.
Conclusion
It is impossible to predict with certainty how the trends outlined above -or other factors currently unforeseen -will affect the delivery of health care in the future. One thing appears reasonably certain, however: physicians who form larger, fully integrated group practices will have better bargaining power relative to their colleagues and smaller groups, regardless of what the future holds. Physicians who form these larger groups may have to surrender some autonomy to ensure the success of the groups. It is likely that the loss of autonomy will be small, however, in comparison to the benefits achieved through increased market power. In the event any of the other trends bear fruit, larger groups will be better prepared to take advantage of these developments.
It is true that at some point, a group's size can raise concerns about monopoly power. That risk can be controlled, however, and it does not prohibit a large group in one market from merging with groups in other markets. In any event, given physicians' current lack of bargaining power, concerns about excess bargaining power would be a welcome relief.
